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Abstract
The real-world networks are large and complex
entities and there are many studies on
mathematical models in simulating real-network
structure. This paper proposed a platform to
simulate protection strategies against attacks in
order to gain better understanding of the
relation between network characteristics and
information security [1] [2]. We set up several
attack and protection strategies in three network
models. The attacker carries out attack and the
defender uses limited resources to improve the
defenses ofnetwork. For a given cost ofattacks,
we will analyze the impacts of network
characteristics and show their effectiveness of
protection.
Keywords: Cluster Coefficient, Betweenness, Scale-Free
network, Small- World network
1. Introduction
Random network model is frequently used to
study real-network, however, the real-ne~~rk
contains complex structures and characteristics
that are not sufficiently expressed by random
network model. Thus we use three network
models to represent real-network. The network
attackers and defenders have different strategies.
The attacker will apply strategies to minimize
the attack cost. The defender has limited
resources, and allocate minimal resources [3] [4]
in achieving the effect ofprotection.
In this paper three models are used to
represents different characteristics of network.
Resources will be allocated in the nodes, edge do
not contain any weight. The action of attack will
spend an equal amount of cost as the protection
resources in the nodes in order to occupy or pass
through the nodes.
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2. Network Characteristics
The degree of node i is denoted by d; and the
set of adjacent nodes of i is represented by N;.
Absolute value of a set equals to the number of
elements in the set, thus d, =1 N; I. Let C; be the
clustering coefficient of node i.
C· = 2E· [d,(d. -1), E; is the total number ofI I I I
connections between nodes in N;. The maximum
value of E; is d;*(d;-1 )/2, thus C; is a ratio
between 0 and 1. If E; is written as
s, = LjeN; INj -;», 1/2 , then C; can be
rewritten as c, =LjeN;INjnNj I/dj(dj-l)
The betweenness value of nodes represents
the importance of each node in the network. The
value show the frequency of node i in the list of
shortest paths between any two given nodes.
Defme B, as the betweenness value of node i
p. = L s;t;;tteV a st (i)/() st > a st is the number
I s;tt
of shortest path from node s to node t. a st (i) is
the number of shortest path from node s to node
t passing through node i. j3; is thus a value
between 0 and 1.
3. Network Models
Three well known network models used in
this study are the random network [5] , scale-free
network [6] and small-world network [7].
Random network is constructed by randomly
connect any two nodes. Scale-free network
contains a few nodes with high degree, and the
other nodes have low degree. This characteristic
remains unchanged despite of the network size.
Node degrees of the majority of nodes in
small-world network are rather alike.
Small-world network has a higher average
clustering coefficient and shorter path distance
between any two nodes than scale-free network.
We assume that resources are allocated in the
node, and the total defending resources are equal
to attack cost. We further assume that the
attacker knows the network structure and
calculates attacking path in advance.
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For uniform distribution strategy, defender
allocates most of the resources in some nodes
that have lower probability to be attacked. All
three network models have similar value of
attack costs; this indicates that uniform
protection strategy can not provide effective
defenses.
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Figure 2. degree distribution in scale-free
network
The following three figures, Figure 2, 3 and 4,
illustrate the degree distribution of the three
network models with one hundred nodes.
4. Attack & Protection Strategies
Two attack strategies are studied in this paper,
uniform attack strategy (UAS) and non-uniform
attack strategy (NAS). Uniform attack strategy
(UAS) chooses the path of attack with uniform
probability. Non-uniform attack strategy (NAS)
selects the path of attack taking into
consideration network characteristics. Each node
in the network, its importance was different, so
the attack path will have two properties: (1)
attack more nodes, (2) choose the most
important nodes to attack. This attack can be
more effect of the path by a greater impact.
Four resource allocation strategies are used:
uniform distribution; degree distribution;
clustering coefficient distribution and
betweenness distribution.
A. Uniform distribution: Refers to the average
resources allocated to all nodes. If R is the
total resources, then assigned to each node
of resources for R/n, where n is the number
of nodes in the network.
B. Degree distribution: Calculate the degree of
each node and normalized for the rate. Then
allocate resources to each node by this rate.
C. Clustering coefficient distribution: Calculate
the clustering coefficient for each node,
normalize and allocate resources by the rate.
D. Betweenness distribution: Calculate the
betweenness of each node for the rate, and
then use this rate to allocate resources on the
nodes.
5. Simulation Result
5.1. VAS vs. protection strategies
In this subsection, three network models
adopting uniform protection strategies are
simulated. Figure I shows the relations between
the costs of attack for three network models.
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Figure 3. degree distribution in small-world
network
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Figure 4. degree distribution in random
network
Figure 1. VAS vs. uniform distribution cost
graph
From Figure 2, one prominent characteristic
of the scale-free network is that only few nodes
have high node degree, and the majority of
nodes have low node degree. The degree
distributions in the small-world network and
random network are similar. Figure 5 shows the
cost ofUAS vs. degree distribution strategy.
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Figure 5. VAS vs. degree distribution cost
graph
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For degree distribution strategy, attacker pays
a higher cost in the scale-free network. This is
due to high degree nodes in the scale-free
network. These nodes have high probability to
be attacked, to increasing the attack cost; the
protection strategy must allocate sufficient
resources in the high degree nodes. The costs of
attack are rather low for both small-world and
random network models if degree distribution
defending strategy is used.
5.1.3. VAS vs, clustering coefficient
distribution
The following three figures, Figure 6, 7 and 8,
show the clustering coefficient distribution of the
three network models with one hundred nodes.
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Figure 6. clustering coefficient distribution in
scale-free network, average clustering
coefficient is 0.2213
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Figure 7. clustering coefficient distribution in
small-world network, average clustering
coefficient is 0.5229
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Figure 9. VAS vs. clustering coefficient
distribution cost graph
Figure 9 illustrates the costs of attack for three
network models. All three network models
exhibit rather low value of attack costs. Even
though scale-free and small-world network
models have rather different average clustering
coefficient, the overall effectiveness in
distributing protection resources according to
clustering coefficients is rather low for all three
network models.
5.1.4. VAS vs. betweenness distribution
The following three figures, Figure 10, 11,
and 12, are the betweenness distribution of three
networks with one hundred nodes.
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Figure 10. betweenness distribution in
scale-free network
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Figure 11. betweenness distribution in
small-world network
From Figure 10, II and 12, these three
betweenness distributions for three network
modes are similar. The relationship between
betweenness distribution and network structure
are not significant.
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5.3. Results
From those simulation results we know that
the cost of attack is rather low for random
network model using all four defending
strategies. This is because random network
contains no apparent network structure. For
scale-free network, the degree and betweenness
defending strategies can effectively increase the
attack cost, while adopting clustering coefficient
as a defending resource allocation guide is not a
good way to raise attack cost.
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Figure 12. betweenness distribution in
random network
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Figure 13. VAS vs, betweenness distribution
cost graph
One result from this study is that uniform
attack strategy is not an effective way for any
network models. And to defend a real-world
network, protection strategies based on network
characteristics can offer good protections against
random and non-uniform attacks. Furthermore, if
the real-world network exhibits scale-free
characteristics, defending strategies by allocating
resources according to the degree and
betweenness distribution is an effective way to
increase the attack costs.
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